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THE "AGGRIEVED PERSON" REQUIREMENT IN ZONING
INTRODUCTION
During the past twenty years, there has been a growing body of law
in the area of zoning. Zoning enabling legislation has now been passed
in all fifty states' under the power commonly referred to as the police
power.2 This power normally rests in the state legislature, but very
often it is delegated to individual towns and cities within a state.
Although each state has its own statutory enactments, the comprehen-
sive zoning ordinances enacted within the several states normally follow
the same general pattern. Most state statutes are very similar to the
Standard Zoning Enabling Act3 under which there is a general dele-
gation of power to a city to regulate and control the use of property.
Although today there is a recognition of the many benefits that derive
from these land-use laws, there have also developed certain areas where
judicial review has become necessary in order to preserve the right of
an individual in private property which could be interfered with by
restrictions and changes in the zoning plans.4
Generally, a board of appeals or adjustment is established to hear
and decide appeals from any order or determination made by an ad-
ministrative officer, or to authorize variances or exceptions from the
strict terms of an ordinance.5 A board of zoning appeals ordinarily
acquires jurisdiction of a case when a party who has applied for a
building permit is refused, or when some affected third party opposes
the issuance of a permit. For the purpose of providing flexibility in
the administration of zoning ordinances and of safeguarding the rights
of an individual in the use of his property, the Standard Enabling Act
provides that appeals may be taken to a Court by a "person aggrieved
.. . by any decision of the administrative officer." 6 This same right
1. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L.
REv. 367, 369 n. 3 (1965).
2. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAMCE § 1-1 (3rd ed. 1965); HAAR, LAND-UsE PLAN-
NiNG 147 (1959); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. See, 3 RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 100-1 (3rd ed. 1964).
4. Id., at 100-1 to -6. The Standard Enabling Act specifically provides for judicial
review of zoning determinations.
5. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., tit. 8-1 to 8-13 (1960); ILL. STAT. ANN., vol. 25,
§ 73-1 to 73-5 (1961); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 40A, § 1-22 (1959); VA. CODE ANN.,
§ 15.1-495 (1964).
6. id., at 100-1 to -6.
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is found in almost all of the state statutes,7 although none of them define
who may qualify as an "aggrieved person." Thus, it has been left to
the courts to determine what standing a person must have to appeal a
decision of the board of appeals or adjustment. The decisions of the
courts in determining this issue have created a conflict as to the pro-
cedural standing that a person must have to qualify as a "person ag-
grieved."
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL IN GENERAL
The right to appeal a decision of the zoning board of appeals or
adjustment is not available until all possible administrative remedies are
exhausted.8 Once a final decision is rendered and no other administrative
alternative exists, a party then has the right of judicial review as long
as he can prove that he is an "aggrieved person" as a result of a zoning
board's decision.9
Generally, it is held that to be an "aggrieved person;" i.e., one au-
thorized by statute to bring review proceedings, one must be special-
ly, personally, and adversely affected by the board's determination, as
distinguished from a party who is only affected in a general way." The
7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., tit. 8, § 8-8 (Cum. Supp. 1965); Dat.. CODE ANN.,
ch. 22, § 328 (Cum. Supp. 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN., § 176.16 (Cum. Supp. 1965); ILL.
STAT. ANN., ch. 24, § 11-13-13 (1962); BuRNs IND. STAT. ANN., § 53-783 (1964); IoWA
CoDE ANN., § 414.15 (1949); MARYLAND STAT. ANN., art. 66B, § 7(J) (1957); MAss. GEN.
LAWS, ch. 40A, § 21 (1952); ME. STAT. ANN., tit. 29-31, § 4954(2) (1965); MicI. STAT.
ANN., vol. 4A, 5.2940 (1958); S.C. CODE, ch. 4, § 14-376 (1962); VA. CODE ANN., § 15.1-497
(1964). The Virginia statute, which is typical of most states, is as follows: "Certiorai
to review decision of board-Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by
any decision of the board of zoning appeals, or any taxpayer . . ., may present to the
circuit or corporation court of the county or city a petition specifying the grounds on
which aggrieved within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the
board." (Emphasis added).
8. County Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 193 A.2d 483 (1963).
9. Langbein v. Planning Bd. of Stamford, 145 Conn. 674, 146 A.2d 412 (1958) (burden
of proving that one is an "aggrieved person" is on the party appealing); Luery v. Zoning
Bd. of Stamford, 150 Conn. 136, 187 A. 2d 247 (1962) (issue is ordinarily one that is a
question of law for the court to determine).
10. See, e.g., Josephson v. Planning Bd. of Stamford, 151 Conn. 489, 199 A. 2d 690
(1964); Tyler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A. 2d 832 (1958); Langbein
v. Planning Bd. of Stamford, 145 Conn. 674, 146 A. 2d 412 (1958); O'Connor v. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A. 2d 515 (1953); Moran v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
17 I1. App. 280, 149 N.E. 2d 480 (1958); Speakman v. Mayor, 8 N.J. 250, 84 A. 2d
715 (1951); Hattem v. Silver, 19 Misc. 2d 1091, 190 N.YS. 2d 752 (1958); Bloom v.
Wides, 164 Ohio St. 138, 128 N.E. 2d 31 (1955); Flynn v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 77
R. I. 118, 73 A. 2d 808 (1950).
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majority of the courts have tended to stress the importance of some legal
or equitable interest in the subject matter of the decision in order for
a person to have the standing necessary to appeal." However, a minority
of courts have been more liberal in granting the right of appeal by
taking a broad view of the requirements in interpreting the "aggrieved
person" provision of the statutes. These courts have allowed an appeal
as a matter or right as long as a party is adversely affected within the
scope of the zoning ordinances. 12 On the other hand, most courts hold
that mere generalizations and fears are not sufficient to entitle one to
appeal.' 3 Thus if a party's only interest in appealing is to have strict en-
forcement of the zoning regulations or to protect general property
values, these facts alone are not a sufficient interest to grant a party
the standing to appeal. 14 Thus it appears that some courts have allowed
much greater latitude than others in determining the qualifications of
a party as an aggrieved person. Since there are several situations in
which one might appeal to the courts, the following sections will
discuss each of these situations in detail specifically concerning the
rights of and the limitations upon the complainants as expressed by the
courts. The first situation below deals with those individuals who have
a direct interest in the property and are appealing to the courts because
their application for permit or variance had been denied.
APPLICANTS SEEKING "AGGRIEVED PERSON" STATUS
An owner of property obviously has the right to appeal a decision
denying him a variance or an exception, since being the outright, fee
simple owner of realty, he has a definite legal interest in the land and
thus is always accorded the status of an "aggrieved person." 1 In an
11. Cases cited note 10 supra.
12. Buckminster v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Pawtucket, 69 R.I. 396, 30 A. 2d 104
(1943); O'Connor v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A. 2d 515 (1953).
13. Tucker v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 151 Conn. 510, 199 A. 2d 685 (1964); Joyce
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 696, 187 A. 2d 239 (1962); Garner v. DuPage
County, 133 N.E. 2d 303, 8 IIl. 2d 155 (1956).
14. Downey v. Inc. Village of Ardsley, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 195, aff'd mem., 158 N.YS. 2d
306, 3 A.D. 2d 663 (1957); Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N.Y.S. 2d 855 (1953); Property Owners
Ass'n of Garden City Estates, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2 Misc. 2d 309, 123 N.Y.S.
2d 716 (1953).
15. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So. 2d 307 (1942); Maranelli
v. Bd. of Appeals of the Bldg. Dep't., 275 Mass. 169, 175 N.E. 479 (1931); Frankel v.
City of Baltimore, 223 Md. 640, 162 A. 2d 447 (1961); Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Bd. of
Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21 A. 2d 845 (1941); Slater v. Toohill, 276 App. Div. 850,
93 N.Y.S. 2d 153 (1949); Appeal of Denny Building Corp., 387 Pa. 311, 127 A. 2d 724
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Ohio decision, the court stated that there could be no question but that
the owner of property who was denied a nonconforming-use permit
was a "party adversely affected" and was a proper party to appeal. 6
Furthermore, a Pennsylvania court held that the record owners of land
subject to an uncompleted agreement of sale, had a sufficient interest
to appeal, as the owner might not get his purchase price if the vendee
could not use the land as he planned.17 Thus, an owner of property
involved in a zoning determination has the right to appeal any decision
adverse to his interests. However, the courts have not been as unani-
mous in viewing the right of a prospective vendee to appeal.
Prospective vendees under a contract to purchase the affected property
are accorded different procedural standings depending upon the type
of contract, conditional or unconditional, under which the sale is to be
consummated. A third situation is found when the legal owner consents
or joins with the prospective vendee in the zoning proceedings.
The general rule allows a prospective vendee under an unconditional
contract to purchase the land the right to appeal a decision in regard
to the-property involved.' 8 The reason commonly given by the courts
for this view is that under the general principles of property law, a
prospective vendee is the equitable owner of the land and thus has a
sufficient interest in the property to entitle him to appeal.19 Thus, if
the contract is unconditional and both parties are legally bound to accept
the terms of the contract, an equitable owner is considered an "ag-
grieved person" within the meaning of the statutes.
(1957); Scholl v. Yeadon, 148 Pa. Super. 601, 26 A. 2d 135 (1942); Hickerson v. Flannery,
42 Tenn. App. 329, 302 S.W. 2d 508 (1956); Clark v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y.
86, 92 N.E. 2d 903 (1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 933 (1951); Flynn v. Zoning Bd. of
Review, 77 R.I. 118, 73 A. 2d 808 (1950); Dunham v. Zoning Bd., 68 R.I. 88, 26 A. 2d
614 (1942).
16. Ohio State Students Trailer Co-Op, Inc. v. County of Franklin, 68 Ohio L. Abs.
569, 123 N.E. 2d 542 (1953).
17. Elvan v. Exley, 58 Pa. D. & C. 538 (1947). See also, Hayden v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 214 A. 2d 837 (Conn. 1965) (a part owner of realty may appeal alone);
Moyerman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustments, 37 Del. Co. 87 (Pa. 1951); Weber v. Cheyenne,
55 Wyo. 202, 97 P. 2d 667 (1940).
18. See, e.g., Burr v. Keene, 105 N.H. 228, 196 A. 2d 63 (1963); Cox v. Wall Tp.,
39 N.J. Super. 243, 120 A. 2d 779 (1956); Sigretto v. Bd. of Adjustment, 134 N.JL. 587,
50 A. 2d 492 (1946); Union Free School Dist. v. Hewlett Bay Park, 198 Misc. 932, 102
N.Y.S. 2d 81 (1950), aff'd in 278 App. Div. 706, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 831 (1951); Henry Norman
Associates, Inc. v. Ketler, 16 Misc. 2d 764, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 875 (1959); Mandalay Constr.,
Inc. v. Zimmer, 27 Misc. 2d 543, 194 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (1959).
19. See, e.g., Scheer v. Weis, 13 Wis. 2d 408, 108 N.E. 2d 523 (1961); Seithick v.
Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. D. & C. 2d 43 (1957).
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Also, according to the majority view, a purchaser under a contract
conditioned upon the granting of a variance or exception is allowed to
appeal a decision denying his request.20 The courts, in support of this
view, often give as a reason the fact that the equitable owner might
be deemed the agent of the true owner. 21 A Massachusetts court went
so far as to hold that a conditional vendee was an "aggrieved person"
because of the economic interests he had in the property.22
On the other hand, a minority of courts have denied the prospective
vendee, under a conditional contract, the right to appeal. The reasoning
given by the courts in denying standing is that the holder of a conditional
contract cannot prove sufficient hardship as a result of an adverse de-
cision by a board of appeals or adjustment, since under a conditional
contract, the purchaser is not legally bound to purchase; and thus is
not in danger of losing anything. 23
It appears, however, that the majority view is the better reasoned, as
a prospective vendee under a conditional contract would still appear
to have a special and personal interest in the outcome of the zoning
determination. Furthermore, the hardship involved because of the
denial of the variance or exception not only affects the individual re-
questing it, but mainly attaches to the property itself, and a prospective
vendee does have an equitable interest in the property. These interests
should be sufficient to entitle him to appeal and the courts should not
deny him the right to judicial review merely because his contract is
conditional upon some other factor.
In several cases the courts have allowed a prospective vendee the
right to appeal because the legal owner had joined in or consented to
the zoning proceedings. 24 In this situation the courts do not have to
20. See, e.g., Arant v. Bd. of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Gray
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 154 Cal. App. 2d 700, 316 P. 2d 618 (1957); Burr v. Keene, 105
N.H. 228, 196 A. 2d 63 (1963); Reiskin v. County Council, 229 Md. 142, 182 A. 2d 34
(1962); City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A. 2d 482 (1954).
21. Arant v. Bd. of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Wilson v. Town-
ship Comm., 123 N.J.L. 474, 9 A. 2d 771 (1939); Hickox v. Griffin, 274 App. Div. 792, 79
N.Y.S. 2d 193 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E. 2d 836 (1949) (held
that even if an equitable owner did not have sufficient interest to appeal alone, yet he
still was deemed to act as agent for and with the consent of the legal owner).
22. Carson v. Bd. of Appeals, 321 Mass. 649, 75 N.E. 2d 116 (1947).
23. Sun Oil Co. v. Macauley, 72 R.I. 206, 49 A. 2d 917 (1946); McNichol v. Gallagher,
66 Pa. D. & C. 338 (1948); Minney v. Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P. 2d 255 (1948),
app. dism'd 359 U.S. U.S. 436, 79 S. Ct. 941 (1959).
24. See, e.g., Dade County v. Jim's Northwest, Inc., 171 So. 2d 612 (Fla. App. 1965);
Marinelli v. Bd. of Appeals of the Bldg. Dep't, 275 Mass. 169, 175 N.E. 479 (1931); Colt
v. Bernard, 279 S.W. 2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Slamowitz v. Jelleme, 3 N.J. Misc.
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decide if the prospective vendee is contractually bound or not, as the legal
owner, by his conduct in joining in the application, indicates his acquies-
cence in the zoning requests put forth by the prospective vendee.
In conclusion, it appears that a prospective vendee, under either a
conditional or unconditional contract, can easily insure his standing in
court by merely having the legal owner join with him in applying for
the zoning change. The validity of the minority view in denying the
conditional vendee the right to appeal seems dubious, as he still is the
equitable owner and would have a strong personal interest in the pro-
ceedings, especially when the contract is conditioned only upon the
granting of a variance or exception.
Still another situation in which the courts have determined "aggrieved
person"' status is that of a lessee. While there is authority to the con-
trary, a lessee has been regarded as having sufficient standing to appeal.
When there is a written lease the courts recognize the binding nature
of the lease and point out that a lessee may be just as seriously aggrieved
or affected by an action of an administrative board as the legal owner.
25
The Rhode Island Supreme Court went even further and specifically
stated that a lessee had a sufficient interest in the leased premises to
permit him alone to appeal a decision of the town's zoning board.2
6
However, where there exists an oral lease, several courts have denied
the lessee the right to institute proceedings affecting the leased property.
27
The courts in denying this right have stressed the fact that a lessee under
an oral lease cannot suffer any unnecessary hardships because he is not
bound to remain on the premises involved.
28
The distinction made by the courts between oral and written leases
1169, 130 Atl. 883 (1925); State ex rel. Waltz & Pemco, Inc. v. Independence, 69 Ohio
L. Abs. 445, 125 N.E. 2d 911 (1952), State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. Euclid, 164 Ohio St.
265, 130 N.E. 2d 336 (1955); Stoll v. Gulf Oil Corp., 79 Ohio L. Abs. 145, 155 N.E. 2d
83 (1958); Jersey Triangle Corporation v. Bd. of Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21 A. 2d 845
(1941).
25. See, e.g., Finn v. Municipal Council of Clifton, 136 N.J.L. 34, 53 A. 2d 790
(1947); Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A. 2d 604 (1958);
Richmond v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 137 A. 2d 280 (1958)
(court also considered the tenant as the agent of the owner).
26. Ralston Purina Company v. Zoning Bd. of Westerly, 64 R.I. 197, 12 A. 2d 219
(1940).
27. See, e.g., In re McLaughlin, 42 Del. Co. 388 (Pa.C.&P. 1955); Bloom v. Wides,
164 Ohio St. 138, 138 N.E. 2d 31 (1955).
28. Kleinman v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 6 Pa. D. & C. 679,42 Del. Co. 413 (1955); Little
Rock v. Goodman, 222 Ark. 350, 260 S.W. 2d 450 (1953) (held that mere tenants-at-will
were not real parties in interest); see also, Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 186 A.
2d 325 (1962).
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does not appear to be a fair one. Under both types of leases, there
exists a binding legal obligation which should support the legal interest
requirement of the "aggrieved person." Furthermore, the courts should
especially examine the length of a lease and the economic interest that
a lessee might have in the premises. It would seem that a lessee has just
as avid an interest in the use of the property leased and could be equally
as damaged as the legal owners by an adverse zoning decision.
The holder of a bare option to purchase realty is generally not ac-
corded the status of an "aggrieved person." 29 One reason given for
denying him the right to appeal is that the holder of an option is not
bound to purchase the land, and thus is without any legal right or in-
terest in the property which might incur hardship as a result of an
adverse zoning decision.30
However, the holder of an option to purchase has ordinarily been
granted standing to appeal when joined by the legal owner, 31 just as
in the case of a prospective vendee under a conditional contract. More-
over, a few courts have gone so far as to allow an optionee the right
to appeal alone, even without the joinder of the legal owner.32 These
courts have noted that under the terms of an option agreement, the
owner contemplated that the optionee would take action, and thus they
allow the optionee the right to appeal.33 It would seem, however, that
the better view would require the optionee to have at least the consent
of the legal owner before he is granted the status of an "aggrieved
person."
Another situation involving the consent of the legal owner is the
status of an agent. The courts have generally held that an owner of
property may designate an agent to prosecute an appeal on his behalf,
or that he may assign his rights to another for the purpose of seeking
zoning determinations.34 As a result of this view, in several cases where
29. See generally, 2 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING, § 40-6 (3d ed. 1956); Tripp v.
Zoning Bd. of Review, 84 R.I. 262, 123 A. 2d 144 (1956).
30. Parise v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 92 R.I. 338, 168 A. 2d 476 (1961) (under the
terms of an option agreement, only the optionor is legally bound to sell).
31. See, e.g., Cranston Jewish Center v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 93 R.I. 364, 175 A. 2d
269 (1961); Hickerson v. Flannery, 42 Tenn. App. 329, 302 S.W. 2d 508 (1956); Dunham
v. Zoning Bd. of Westerly, 68 R.I. 88, 26 A. 2d 614 (1942).
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S.W. 2d 14 (1937); Hatch v. Fiscal
Court of Fayette County, 242 S.W. 2d 1018 (Ky. 1951).
33. Babitzke v. Harvester, 32 Ill. App. 2d 899, 177 N.E. 2d 644 (1961); see cases cited
note 32 supra.
34. See, e.g., Arant v. Bd. of Adjustments, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1961); Cohn
v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (1955); Feneck v.
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the courts have found difficulty in establishing a direct legal interest in
a party, the courts have deemed such a party an agent, based upon some
legal relationship existing between the party and the legal owner.3Y This
relationship was previously discussed in regard to both prospective ven-
dees and holders of a bare option to purchase.3" Thus in most jurisdic-
tions an owner may delegate an agent to prosecute an appeal, and there
appears no valid reason why an agent should not have the rights of and
be accorded the same status as the legal owner.
In conclusion, one who has a direct interest in the property and who
is denied a zoning change is ordinarily granted the status of an aggrieved
person. Thus, in determining the status of applicants, the courts have
emphasized the factor of some legal or equitable interest in the property.
Therefore, when an applicant can prove no legally cognizable interest,
he is usually denied the right to judicial review.37 But there has been
some willingness on the part of a few courts to allow a party to appeal
even though he was without a direct legal interest in the affected prop-
erty, although in these cases there can usually be found some economic
interests to which the courts have given some importance. This is seen
in a Wisconsin case where an insurance company was allowed to appeal
even though it had no legal interest, because it stood to lose a great
deal of money if the zoning administrators denied a repair permit.,
Thus, although a majority of the courts stress the importance of the
Murdock, 16 Misc. 2d 789, 181 N.Y.S. 2d 441 (1958); Hickox v. Griffin, 274 App. Div.
792, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 196, re'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E. 2d 836; Stout v.
Jenkins, 268 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1954) (construction company allowed to appeal on the
part of an absentee owner); Protomastro v. Bd. of Adjustment, 3 N.J. Super 539, 67 A. 2d
261 (1949) rev'd on other grounds, 3 N.Y. 494, 70 A. 2d 873 (1950) (architect in place
of true owner).
35. See cases cited notes 24, 34 supra.
36. See cases cited notes 21 & 24, 31-33 supra.
37. See, e.g., Jensen's Inc. v. Town of Plainville, 146 Conn. 311, 150 A. 2d 297 (1959);
Kreiger v. Scott, 4 N.J. Misc. 942, 134 Ad. 901 (1926); Underhill v. Bd. of Appeals, 17
Misc. 2d 257, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 588, aff'd in 273 App. Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 327 aff'd 297
N.Y. 937, 80 N.E. 2d 342 (1948); Appeal of Schaeffer, 7 Pa. D. & C. 2d 468, 72 Montg.
Co. L. R. 515 (1956) (applicant's only interest was a "hope" to purchase realty); Linden-
wood Improvement Ass'n v. Lawrence, 278 S.W. 2d 30 (Ky. 1958); Belle Haven
Citizens Ass'n Inc. v. Schumann, 201 Va. 36, 109 S.E. 2d 139 (1959); Dimitri v. Zoning
Bd. of Review, 61 R.I. 325, 200 Ad. 963 (1938); Hattem v. Silver, 19 Misc. 2d 1091, 190
N.Y.S. 2d 752 (1958) (owner who had divested himself of title during the proceedings,
held no longer to be aggrieved person).
38. State ex riel. Home Ins. Co. v. Burt, 23 Wis. 2d 231, 127 N.W. 2d 270 (1964); see
also, Binford v. Western Electric Co., 219 Ga. 404, 133 S.E. 2d 361 (1963); Bd. of Zoning
Appeals v. Moyer, 108 Ind..App. 198, 27 N.E. 2d 905 (1940); Tranionti v. Zoi ngBd.
of Review, 93 R.I. 131, 172 A. 2d 93 (1961).
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legal factor, a few courts have recognized the hardship that could be
suffered by one with only an economic interest, and have justly ac-
corded such individuals the right of appeal.
Looked at in its broadest application, the "aggrieved person" provision
in the zoning statutes was meant to provide a safety device to those who
felt that the decision of the administrator or zoning board was unjust
or arbitrary in regard to their property. The fact that an application
was signed by an oral lessee or conditional vendee should not in itself
deny such a party the right to appeal without other factors also being
considered. But because of the indefiniteness of the statutes as to who
qualifies under the "aggrieved person" provision, the courts have conse-
quently been forced to determine this issue for themselves, and the
result has been an unfortunate lack of uniformity in their decisions.
However, this indefiniteness in the wording of the statutes has proved
beneficial in one aspect, in that it has allowed the courts to grant
.'aggrieved" status to third parties with no direct interest in the property.
THIRD PARTIES AS "PERSONS AGGRIEVED"
Under the typical state statute, which allows "any person or persons
jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the board of zoning
appeals, or any taxpayer . . ." 39 to appeal to the courts, a third party,
not owning the property in question, may still qualify as an aggrieved
person under the broad provisions of the statutes. A third party may
be in such a situation that a decision of the board would adversely
affect him in the use or enjoyment of his property. Thus, even though
he is without a direct legal or equitable interest in the involved property,
he is given the right to appeal. Just as the courts have developed different
views upon the status of applicants seeking court review, there is also
a diversity of opinion upon the requirements for third parties.
That a third party should have this right of review is basic to zoning
theory. A New Jersey court has stated that "One of the fundamental
theories of a zoning ordinance is to place all owners in a zone on the
same footing and avoid invidious distinctions." 4o Thus one owner
would seem to have a lively interest in zoning decisions involving other
owners in the same zoning district: However, the courts have held that
in order to qualify as a third party aggrieved, it is necessary to prove
some special damages which are not generally shared with other property
39. VA. CODE ANN., § 15.1-497 (1964).
40. Conaway v. Atlantic City, 107 N.J. Law 404, 154 A. 2d 6, 7 (1961).
[Vol. 8:29+-
THE "AGGRIEVED PERSON" REQUIREMENT
owners similarly situated.41 Generally, within the third party classi-
fication are nearby property owners, nonresidents, business competitors,
taxpayers, and associations. The remainder of this discussion will be
devoted to the "aggrieved person" status of these third parties.
It is generally held that one who is in close proximity to the property
for which a variance or use permit was issued and who can also prove
a special interest in the proceedings, has sufficient standing to appeal
a decision granting a permit.42 Ordinarily, the fact that one is in close
proximity is in itself sufficient to establish the required interest neces-
sary for court review.43 When the land abuts the property in question,
there is no doubt of the adjoining owner's right to appeal.44 However,
the courts have not reached consistent views in regard to those relatively
near the property involved. For instance, one court held that one whose
property was more than two blocks away was an "aggrieved person," 4
and several others have sustained the right to appeal by those who owned
a home on a different street, one-half mile away,4 6 or those who
resided a "short distance" away. 47 On the other hand, these same courts
have denied the right to appeal to one who was a considerable distance
away and out of sight of the affected property.4" Moreover, it has
41. See cases cited notes 8-14 supra; see also Downey v. Incorporated Village of
Ardsley, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd mern., 2 App. Div. 2d 663, 158 N.Y.S.
2d 306 (1957); Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N.Y.S. 2d 855 (1953); 1 RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZoNiNG
ANED PLAN NG, 631 (3d ed. 1956).
42. See cases cited notes 43-47 infra.
43. Heady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 463, 94 A. 2d 789 (1953); Kammer-
man v. Leroy, 133 Conn. 232, 50 A.2d 175 (1946).
44. Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1959); Spaulding v. Bd. of Appeals,
334 Mass. 688, 138 N.E. 2d 367 (1956); Hernreich v. Quinn, 350 Mo. 770, 168 S.W. 2d
1054 (1943); Paris v. Eisenberg, 35 Misc. 2d 934, 231 N.Y.S. 2d 189 (1962); Gerling
v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 11 Misc. 2d 871, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 358 (1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 App. Div. 2d 247, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (held that proof of special injury not
necessary if land abuts).
45. Toomey v. Gomeringer, 235 Md. 456, 201 A. 2d 842 (1964).
46. See, e.g., Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 21 Conn. Supp. 102, 145 A. 2d
241 (1958); O'Connor v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A. 2d 515 (1953);
Conaway v. Atlantic City, 107 N.J.L. 404, 154 A. 2d 6 (1961); Feldman v. Nassau Shores,
Estates, Inc., 12 Misc. 2d 607, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1958).
47. See, e.g., Bright v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 149 Conn. 698, 183 A. 2d 603 (1961);
Michigan Lake Building Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 IM. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930); Building
Inspector of Acon v. Bd. of Appeals, 204 N.E. 2d 296 (Mass. 1965); Vainas v. Bd. of
Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 150 N.E. 2d 721 (1958); Reynolds v. Bd. of Appeals, 335 Mass.
464, 140 N.E. 2d 491 (1957); Heath v. Mayor, 190 Md. 478, 58 A. 2d 896 (1948); Flynn
v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 77 R.I. 118, 73 A. 2d 808 (1950); Buckminster v. Zoning Bd.
of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 30 A. 2d 104 (1943).
48. Pattison v. Corby, 226 Md. 97, 172 A. 2d 490 (1961), re-affirmed in Marcus v.
Montgomery County Council, 235 Md. 535, 201 A. 2d 777 (1964).
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been held in one jurisdiction that those property owners one thousand
feet from the property in question were not aggrieved parties, since the
mere fact that they had to walk by the proposed service station daily
did not sufficiently interfere with their personal or legal rights to
qualify them as "persons aggrieved." 49
Several other decisions also indicate that unless there is a claim that
some property right or other legal interest is affected by the granting
of a permit to a nearby property owner, a third party will not be ac-
corded the status of an aggrieved party." For example, a Georgia court
has held that where the appellant was situated one-quarter of a mile
away, and where his only objection was increased traffic and congestion,
his interest was not valuable or substantial enough to qualify him as an
aggrieved party. 1 It is obvious that the closer the two parcels of land
are geographically, the easier it is for a court to determine the possible
adverse effect of one upon the other.5
2
In conclusion, it appears that a nearby property owner, in order to
have the right of appeal, must allege not only close proximity, but also
that he has suffered some special or unique injury due to the action of
the zoning board.53
The general rule in regard to nonresidents is that they do not have
the right to appeal decisions of another district's zoning board. 4 How-
ever, some recent decisions indicate that a few courts are beginning to
recognize the interests that a nonresident may have in another district's
zoning ordinance. One court has held that even though the appellants
were not residents, landowners, or taxpayers of the borough, they,
having taken part in the zoning proceedings, had the right to appeal
49. Tucker v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 151 Conn. 510, 199 A. 2d 685 (1964); see also
Tyler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A. 2d 832 (1958); Greenwich Gas
Co. v. Tuthill, 113 Conn. 684, 155 Atl. 850 (1931).
50. Point Lookout Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc. 2d 757, 200 N.Y.S.
2d 925 (1961); see also cases cited note 66 infra.
51. Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 S.E. 2d
793 (1960).
52. 222 East Chestnut Street Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals, 10 I1. 2d 132, 139 N.E. 2d 218
(1956). In Connecticut, where the sale of liquor is involved, every resident or taxpayer
is deemed to have sufficient interest to appeal from a zoning board's decision.
53. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Atkinson, 218 A. 2d 503 (Md. 1966); Krejpcio v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 211 A. 2d 687 (Conn. 1965).
54. See, e.g., Kimberly v. Town of Madison, 127 Conn. 409, 17 A. 2d 504 (1941); Wood
v. Freeman, 43 Misc. 2d 616, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1964); Browning v. Bryant, 178 Misc.
576, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 280, affd menz. 264 App. Div. 777, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 729 (1942); Village of
Russell Gardens v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 30 Misc. 2d 392, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 501 (1961);
Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 455, 117 A. 2d 86 (1960).
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because of the interest shown by their participation.55 Furthermore, a
lower New Jersey count pointed out that ".... the public health, morals
and welfare are not limited by the boundaries of any particular zoning
district, . . . and even property outside a municipality, if benefited
by the prohibited use, acquires a vested right to the benefits.. ." arising
from the zoning ordinance."6 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision and stated that a municipality owes
a duty to allow court review to the residents of adjoining towns who
may be adversely affected by a zoning change.5 7
It would appear that a nonresident, if he can allege and prove specific
damages as a result of an adjoining district's action, should have the
right to appeal. This would seem especially so if the parcels were in
close proximity yet in different zoning areas. The mere fact that one
is a nonresident should not in itself deny one the right to appeal if other
relevant factors can be proven in determining his "aggrieved person"
status.
Other third parties who have often attempted to appeal decisions of
zoning boards are business competitors. Almost uniformly, the courts
have denied the right of court review to those persons whose only
objection to the granting of a variance or exception is that it would
create business competition. 58 Thus, if the sole purpose of an appeal is
to ward off business competition, the courts will deny the appeal upon
the theory that no person has a right to engage in business without com-
petition.59 However, in a recent decision, one court has held that the
mere fact that one is a business competitor does not altogether disable
him from being an aggrieved party, as long as he can prove other adverse
elements such as interference with light or air, increased traffic and con-
gestion, or reduced real estate value."' If these other factors can be
proved, there appears no reason why a business competitor should be
denied the right to review.
55. Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 455, 117 A. 2d 86 (1960).
56. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A. 2d 182, 191
(1953).
57. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 NJ. 238, 104 A. 2d 441 (1954).
58. See, e.g., Mot's Realty Corp. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm., 152 Conn. 535, 209
A. 2d 179 (1965); Whitney Theatre Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 150 Conn. 285, 189
A. 2d 39 (1963); Zuckerman v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 160, 128 A. 2d 325
(1956); Benson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 129 Conn. 280, 27 A. 2d 389 (1942); Circle
Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E. 2d 920 (1949); but see
Jackson's, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 21 Conn. Supp. 102, 145 A. 2d 241 (1958).
59. See, e.g., Westwood Meat Markets, Inc. v. McLucas, 146 Colo. 435, 361 P. 2d 776
(1961); City of Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237 Md. 456, 206 A. 2d 694 (1965).
60. McDermott v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 510, 191 A. 2d 551 (1963).
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The right of a taxpayer to appeal is apparently limited to cases where
he can prove special damage, even though he is specifically granted the
right of appeal by some state statutes."' It does not seem that the taxpayer
status alone should qualify one as an aggrieved party without further
proof of special injury to his realty, if for no other reason than to
reduce the amount of litigation in these matters.
Civic and improvement associations seeking review have generally
not been granted the right to appeal, as ordinarily they are neither tax-
payers nor aggrieved parties in the sense of owning realty. Where the
association does not own any real estate in the zoning district, the courts
have denied it the right of review, since one without ownership cannot
be adversely affected.6 2 However, if an association does own land
separately from that of its members, it is granted the right to appeal.63
Naturally, the civic or improvement association should also be required
to prove special injury before being accorded the status of an "aggrieved
person."
Thus, in order for a third party to qualify as a "person aggrieved," he
must be able to prove some special damage not shared with other prop-
erty owners in the same general vicinity. The statutes allowing "any
person aggrieved" to appeal to the courts has beneficially opened the
door to injured third parties, but as in the case of applicants, the statute
does not define which third parties have the right of review. As a
result the courts have reached conflicting decisions in determining their
status.
CONCLUSION
The procedural standing necessary to qualify as an "aggrieved per-
61. See, e.g., Tyler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A. 2d 832 (1958);
City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E. 2d 773 (1964). The decisions in
Maryland indicate that a taxpayer may appeal even without special damage-see, e.g.,
Norwood Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. 1, 72 A. 2d 1 (1950); Mayor
v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A. 2d 588 (1948); see also Cowles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
214 A. 2d 361 (Conn. 1965); O'Connor v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98
A. 2d 515 (1953).
62. See, e.g., Stoclcsdale v. Barnard, 212 A. 2d 282 (Md. 1965); Norwood Heights
Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. 1, 72 A. 2d 1 (1950); Lindenwood Improvement
Ass'n v. Lawrence, 278 S.W. 2d 30 (Mo. 1955); Feldman v. Nassau Shores Estates, Inc.,
12 Misc. 2d 607, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1958); Property Owners Ass'n of Garden City
Estates, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2 Misc. 2d 309, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1953); Under-
hill v. Bd. of Appeals, 17 Misc. 2d 257, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (1947), aff'd in 273 App. Div.
788, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 327, aff'd in 297 N.Y. 937, 80 N.E. 2d 342 (1948).
63. Putney v. Abington Township, 70 Montg. 102, aff'd in, 176 Pa. Super. 463, 108
A. 2d 134 (1954).
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son" thus depends either upon the legal or equitable interests that one
holds in the affected property; or, if a third party, the incurrence of
some special damage to his property as a result of a zoning decision
upon another's land. Although most courts do not emphasize economic
considerations, the trend is that such economic factors are becoming
more relevant in determining whether a party is in fact aggrieved.
It appears that the courts are searching for a compromise between
too much judicial review and too little. The necessity of judicial review
should not be considered lightly, especially when one realizes the broad
powers granted to zoning boards and administrators. An individual
property owner must have available safeguards against any arbitrary
decisions that might infringe upon the use or enjoyment of his property,
or decrease its value. The "aggrieved person" requirement in zoning
is just such a safeguard, and its interpretation by the courts is of no
minor importance. Thus if a party can show that he is being damaged
in any substantial way by a zoning decision, the courts should liberally
construe the "aggrieved person" requirement so as to bring the indi-
vidual property owner within the scope of the statute.
Perhaps the best solution to the conflicting decisions, caused by the
vagueness of the present statutes, would be to have the state legislature
define more specifically the requirements necessary to qualify as an
"aggrieved party." This would only require a small addition to the
present provisions, and such an amendment would greatly aid the courts
in determining the procedural standing that a party must have. By not
being given any standard to guide them in interpreting the "aggrieved
person" status, the courts are developing their own criteria in an area
that is supposedly controlled by statutory enactments. Thus, in order
to insure that all individuals are being treated equally, definite uniform
standards should be formulated to describe the elements necessary to
qualify as an "aggrieved person."
Robert A. Hendel
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